SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL AEROSPACE REPORTS

A Biweekly Publication of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
VOLUME 44, ISSUE 7 - April 7, 2006

05 AIRCRAFT DESIGN, TESTING AND PERFORMANCE
Includes all stages of design of aircraft and aircraft structures and systems.

Also includes aircraft testing, performance and evaluation, and aircraft and flight simulation technology.

For related information see also 18 Spacecraft Design, Testing and Performance and 39 Structural Mechanics.

For land transportation vehicles see 85 Technology Utilization and Surface Transportation.

20060009124 Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC, USA

How We Made the First Flight

Wright, O.; January 2004; 28 pp.; In English Report No.(s): PB2006-103586; No Copyright; Avail.: CASI: A03, Hardcopy

Aviation is on the cutting edge of technology. The story of the progress and growth of aviation is the story of technological advance. What the Wright brothers started with the first 120 -foot flight on December 17, 1903 has led to space flight and in the process, changed life on earth forever. NTIS

Histories; Flight; Aeronautics; Technology Utilization

20060009923 Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, USA

Joint Strike Fighter: Management of the Technology Transfer Process

Mar. 2006; 26 pp.; In English Report No.(s): PB2006-107506; GAO-06-364; No Copyright; Avail.: CASI: A03, Hardcopy

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is the Department of Defense's (DOD) largest international cooperative effort to develop and produce a major weapon system. Due to the breadth of international participation, the number of export authorizations needed to share information with partner governments, solicit bids from suppliers, and execute contracts is expected to far exceed past transfers of advanced military technology.

In July 2003, GAO reported that managing these transfers and partner expectations while avoiding delays has been a key challenge and recommended that industrial planning tools be developed and used to anticipate time frames for national disclosure and technology transfer decisions. This report examines DOD's response to this recommendation and identifies the practices DOD is using to expedite license processing and avoid program delays.

Agencies have taken four key actions to expedite the processing of licenses for transferring technology to partner countries and foreign suppliers. Each of these practices is intended to anticipate time frames needed for the processing of licenses or avoid delays to the JSF program schedule.

In response to GAO's 2003 recommendation, the JSF Program Office instructed the prime contractor to develop an international industrial plan that identifies the type of license needed to transfer certain technologies to foreign industry. The contractor's plan provides mechanisms for anticipating 'need' dates for submitting license applications and for identifying and addressing potential issues related to the releasability of classified information, technologies, or systems. In addition to the contractor's plan, DOD has developed guidance calling for industrial planning tools in all programs with significant international involvement. Agencies involved in the JSF program are expediting the processing of license applications by dedicating staff to the JSF licensing process, providing consultation to applicants on draft licenses, administering a prescreening process for the transfer of low technology and nonsensitive items, and allowing addendums to be attached to license applications. The JSF prime contractor and agency officials have used options available to them under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, such as Global Project Authorization (GPA) and an exemption used in obtaining foreign contractor bids and proposals, to help facilitate the export control process and avoid program delays.

While GPA is designed to approve exports within 5 days, its use has been limited. Due to the early involvement of international partners in the design phase of the program, decisions related to the releasability of classified information, technologies, or systems to partner countries have been addressed as they arise throughout the development of the system. NTIS

Management Systems; Technology Transfer

20060009925 Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, USA

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production Before Testing Demonstrates Acceptable Performance

Mar. 2006; 44 pp.; In English Report No.(s): PB2006-107505; GAO-06-356; No Copyright; Avail.: CASI: A03, Hardcopy

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is DOD's most expensive aircraft program. The program represents 90 percent of the remaining planned investment for recapitalizing DOD's aging tactical aircraft fleet. GAO is required by law to review the program annually for 5 years, beginning in fiscal year 2005. This is our second report and GAO assessed the program's acquisition approach--in terms of capturing knowledge for key investment decisions--and identified an alternative to improve outcomes.

DOD is investing heavily in procuring JSF aircraft before flight testing proves it will perform as expected. For example, the JSF program plans to produce 424 low-rate initial production aircraft, at a total estimated cost of more than $49 billion, by 2013--the same time at which the program plans to complete initial operational testing. Producing aircraft before testing demonstrates the design is mature increases the likelihood of design changes that will lead to cost growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. Because the program will lack key design and testing knowledge, DOD plans to use cost reimbursement contracts to procure early production aircraft. This type of contract places a substantially greater cost risk on DOD and the taxpayers.

Confidence that investment decisions will deliver expected capability within cost and schedule goals increases as testing proves the JSF will work as expected. At the same time, the JSF program has not adopted an evolutionary approach to acquiring the aircraft--despite DOD policy that prefers such an approach. Instead, the JSF program has contracted to develop and deliver the aircraft's full capability in a single-step, 12-year development program--a daunting task given the need to incorporate the technological advances that, according to DOD, represent a quantum leap in capability. DOD's buying power has already been reduced. Since initial estimates, program acquisition unit costs have increased by 28 percent, or $23 million. Development costs have increased 84 percent, planned purchases have decreased by 535 aircraft, and the completion of development has slipped 5 years, delaying delivery of capabilities to the warfighter. With more than 90 percent of the JSF investment remaining, DOD officials have the opportunity to adopt a knowledge-based and evolutionary acquisition strategy that would maximize DOD's return on its investment.

The acquisition approach used for the F-16 fighter, the Air Force's JSF predecessor, could provide a model for delivering JSF capabilities to the warfighter sooner and recapitalizing tactical aircraft forces more quickly while lowering risk. The F-16 program successfully evolved capabilities over the span of about 30 years, with an initial capability delivered to the warfighter about 4 years after development started. NTIS

Procurement; Military Operations; Military Technology

Source: NASA