SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL AEROSPACE REPORTS

A Biweekly Publication of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
VOLUME 44, ISSUE 1 - January 13, 2006

17 SPACE COMMUNICATIONS, SPACECRAFT COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND TRACKING
Includes space systems telemetry; space communications networks; astronavigation and guidance; and spacecraft radio blackout.

For related information see also 04 Aircraft Communications and Navigation; and 32 Communications and Radar.

20060001847 Test Group (0046th), Holloman AFB, NM USA

Civil GPS Systems and Potential Vulnerabilities

Hoey, David; Benshoof, Paul; Oct. 25, 2005; 6 pp.; In English Contract(s)/Grant(s): FB5209-04-P-0318 Report No.(s): AD-A440372; XC-46TW; No Copyright; Avail.: Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)

Since becoming fully operational, the Global Positioning System (GPS) has consistently proven itself to be an effective force enhancer to the U.S. military and its allies. However, because GPS satellites broadcast a signal freely available to the public, commercial applications of GPS outnumber those of the military by a wide margin and are now embedded in applications the original developers of GPS could never have imagined. Among these applications are those used in the USA' critical national infrastructure, which are becoming increasingly reliant on GPS at an alarming rate. Unfortunately, over-reliance on GPS for critical applications could leave us vulnerable to future asymmetric attacks. The danger stems from what is well understood in military circles: to function properly, GPS receivers must track low-power satellite signals which are very susceptible to jamming or other interference. This paper presents a Department of Defense GPS test perspective on civilian GPS vulnerabilities and potential impacts to critical infrastructure, as well as recommends action to mitigate vulnerability exploitation and help protect vital applications. DTIC

Global Positioning System; Jamming; Vulnerability

20060001849 Test Group (0046th), Holloman AFB, NM USA

Civil GPS Systems and Potential Vulnerabilities

Hoey, David; Benshoof, Paul; Oct. 25, 2005; 6 pp.; In English Contract(s)/Grant(s): FB5209-04-P-0318 Report No.(s): AD-A440379; XC-46TW; No Copyright; Avail.: Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)

Since becoming fully operational, the Global Positioning System (GPS) has consistently proven itself to be an effective force enhancer to the U.S. military and its allies. However, because GPS satellites broadcast a signal freely available to the public, commercial applications of GPS outnumber those of the military by a wide margin and are now embedded in applications the original developers of GPS could never have imagined. Among these applications are those used in the USA' critical national infrastructure, which are becoming increasingly reliant on GPS at an alarming rate. Unfortunately, over-reliance on GPS for critical applications could leave us vulnerable to future asymmetric attacks. The danger stems from what is well understood in military circles: to function properly, GPS receivers must track low-power satellite signals which are very susceptible to jamming or other interference. This paper presents a Department of Defense GPS test perspective on civilian GPS vulnerabilities and potential impacts to critical infrastructure, as well as recommends action to mitigate vulnerability exploitation and help protect vital applications. DTIC

Global Positioning System; Jamming; Vulnerability

20060002260 ITT Defense and Electronics, USA

Defining Command, Control, and Communications (C3) for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

Schultz, Mike; Henriksen, Steve; Proceedings of the Fifth Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance (ICNS) Conference and Workshop; November 2005, pp. 1-19; In English; See also 20060002231; Original contains color illustrations; No Copyright; Avail.: CASI: A03, Hardcopy; Available from CASI on CD-ROM only as part of the entire parent document

The topics include: 1) Access 5; 2) ATC Communications; 3) C2 Communications; and 4) Requirement Verification Process. CASI

Air Traffic Control; Command and Control; Pilotless Aircraft; Voice Communication; National Airspace System

20060002273 CompSys Technologies, Inc., Amherst, NY, USA

Secure Key Management for NASA Space Communication

Balasubramanian, Aruna; Mishra, Sumita; Sridhar, Ramalingam; Proceedings of the Fifth Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance (ICNS) Conference andWorkshop; November 2005; 29 pp.; In English; See also 20060002231; Original contains color illustrations; No Copyright; Avail.: CASI: A03, Hardcopy; Available from CASI on CD-ROM only as part of the entire parent document

NASA envisions advanced technologies and protocols for their missions using space-based networks. The space-based network technology considers the ground stations and the spacecrafts to be a part of one large network, where a spacecraft can potentially connect to a large number of ground stations during its orbit. However, the technology introduces easy access to the spacecraft from the ground, in turn increasing the security risks. Additionally, space-based networks are formed among heterogeneous network entities. Thus, a generic security solution for all communication components may not be well suited. In this work, we study the architecture of space-based networks, and provide a classification for the network entities based on their characteristics. Based on the requirements and limitations of the classification, we provide suitable key management solution for enhanced security and strong authentication. Author

Space Communication; NASA Programs; Communication Networks; Project Management

20060002291 Computer Networks and Software, Inc., Springfield, VA, USA

FASTE-CNS: A Tool for Performance Evaluation of CNS Technologies

Dhas, Chris; Wargo, Chris; Lal, Sachin; Khanna, Mannu; Proceedings of the Fifth Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance (ICNS) Conference and Workshop; November 2005; 22 pp.; In English; See also 20060002231; Original contains color illustrations; No Copyright; Avail.: CASI: A03, Hardcopy; Available from CASI on CD-ROM only as part of the entire parent document

As NASA speculates on and explores the future of aviation, the technological and physical aspects of our environment increasingly become hurdles that must be overcome for success. Several NASA research partners have purposed research into methods for overcoming some of these selected hurdles.

The task of establishing a common evaluation environment was placed on NASA s Virtual Airspace Simulation Technologies (VAST) project (sub-project of Virtual Airspace Modeling and Simulation Project). Their response was the development of the Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES). As one examines the ACES environment from a communication, navigation or surveillance (CNS) perspective, the simulation environment made no provisions for realism in the simulation of CNS. To truly evaluate these concepts in a realistic sense, the contributions/effects of CNS must be part of the ACES.

NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) has supported the Virtual Airspace Modeling and Simulation (VAMS) project through the continued development of CNS models and analysis capabilities that supports the ACES environment. NASA GRC initiated the development a communications traffic loading analysis tool, called the Future Aeronautical Subnetwork Traffic Emulator for Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (FASTE-CNS), as part of this support. This tool allows for forecasting of communications load with the understanding that, there is no single, common source for loading models used to evaluate the existing and planned communications channels, and that consensus and accuracy in the traffic load models is a very important input to the decisions being made on the acceptability of communication techniques used to fulfill the aeronautical requirements.

Leveraging off the existing capabilities of the FASTE-CNS tool, GRC has called for FASTE-CNS to have the functionality to pre- and post-process the simulation runs of ACES to report on instances when traffic density, frequency congestion or aircraft spacing/distance violations have occurred. The integration of these functions require that the CNS models used to characterize these avionics systems be of higher fidelity and better consistency then is present in FASTE-CNS system.

This paper explores the capabilities of FASTE-CNS with renewed emphasis on the enhancements added to perform these processing functions; the fidelity and reliability of CNS models necessary to make the enhancements work. Author

Avionics; Navigation; Surveillance; Communication; Technologies

Source: NASA.