GAO: NRC, DHS Need to Better Track, Detect Radioactive Materials

July 30, 2008 // Published as a news service by IHS

The NRC implemented three of the six recommendations in the 2003 GAO report on the security of radioactive sources.

It worked with the 35 states to which it ceded primary authority to regulate radioactive materials and sources and others to:

1. Identify sealed sources of greatest concern.
2. Enhance requirements to secure radioactive sources.
3. Ensure security requirements are implemented.

In contrast, the NRC made limited progress toward implementing recommendations to:

1. Modify its process for issuing licenses to ensure that radioactive materials cannot be purchased by those with no legitimate need for them.
2. Determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of malicious use of such materials.
3. Examine whether certain radioactive sources should be subject to more stringent regulations.

Beyond acting on the GAO's recommendations, the NRC took four steps to improve its ability to monitor and track radioactive materials, according to the report.

First, the NRC created an interim national database to monitor the licensed sealed sources containing materials that pose the greatest risk of being used in a dirty bomb.

Second, the NRC is developing a national source tracking system to replace the interim database and provide more comprehensive, frequently updated information on potentially dangerous sources.

However, this system was delayed by 18 months and is not expected to be fully operational until January 2009, according to the report.

Third, the NRC is also developing a web-based licensing system that will include more information on all sources and materials that require NRC or state approval to possess.

Finally, the NRC is developing a license verification system that will draw information from the other new systems to enable officials and vendors to verify that those seeking to bring these radioactive materials into the country or purchase them are licensed to do so, according to the report.

However, these systems are more than three years behind schedule and may not include the licensing information, initially at least, on radioactive materials regulated by agreement states - which represent more than 80% of all U.S. licenses for such materials, according to the report.

The delays in the deployment and full development of these systems are especially consequential because the NRC identified their deployment as key to improving the control and accountability of radioactive materials, according to the report.

While the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has a comprehensive system in place to detect radioactive materials entering the U.S. at land borders, some equipment that is used to protect CBP officers is in short supply, according to the report.

Specifically, vehicles, cargo and people entering the U.S. at most ports of entry along the Canadian and Mexican borders are scanned for radioactive materials with radiation detection equipment capable of detecting very small amounts of radiation.

However, the GAO found that personal radiation detectors are not available to all officers who need them. Moreover, while the CBP has systems in place to verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials licenses, it has not effectively communicated to officers at the borders when they must contact officials to verify the license for a given sealed source, according to the report.

Consequently, some CPB officers are not following current guidance and some potentially dangerous radioactive materials entered the country without license verification.

GAO Recommendation
The GAO recommends that the NRC take steps to ensure that the current target dates for launching new systems are not further postponed.

The GAO also recommends that the CBP more effectively communicate guidance on when officers must verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials and take steps to ensure that this guidance is being followed.

In 2003, the GAO found weaknesses in the NRC's radioactive materials licensing process and made recommendations for improvement.

For this report, the GAO assessed:

1. The progress NRC made in implementing the 2003 recommendations.
2. Other steps NRC took to improve its ability to track radioactive materials.
3. The CBP's ability to detect radioactive materials at land ports of entry.
4. The CBP's ability to verify that such materials are appropriately licensed prior to entering the U.S.

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).