GAO: DNDO Lacks Plan to Achieve Comprehensive Nuclear Detection Architecture
July 30, 2008 // Published as a news service by IHS
| |
| Defense & Security Tools |
IHS sells defense, military and security information services to meet the needs of today's engineers.
To learn more, and for a free quote, please complete the form below. |
|
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) took steps to develop a global nuclear detection architecture, but lacks an overarching strategic plan to help guide how it will achieve a more comprehensive architecture, according to a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Specifically, the DNDO developed an initial architecture after coordinating with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Department of State (State) to identify 74 federal programs that combat smuggling of nuclear or radiological material.
The DNDO also identified gaps in the architecture such as land border crossings into the U.S. between formal points of entry, small maritime vessels and international general aviation.
Although the DNDO started to develop programs to address these gaps, it did not develop a plan to guide its transition from the initial architecture to a more comprehensive architecture, according to the report.
For example, such a plan would define across the entire architecture how the DNDO would achieve and monitor its goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes such as small maritime craft or land borders in between points of entry.
The plan would also define the steps and resources needed to achieve a more comprehensive architecture and provide metrics for measuring progress toward goals.
The DNDO and other federal agencies face a number of coordination, technological and management challenges, according to the report.
First, prior GAO reports demonstrated that U.S.-funded radiological detection programs overseas are problematic to implement and sustain and were not effectively coordinated, although there were some improvements in this area, according to the report.
Second, detection technology has limitations and cannot detect and identify all radiological and nuclear materials. For example, smugglers may be able to effectively mask or shield radiological materials so that it evades detection.
Third, the DNDO faces challenges in managing implementation of the architecture, according to the report.
The DNDO was charged with developing an architecture that depends on programs implemented by other agencies. This responsibility poses a challenge for the DNDO in ensuring that the individual programs within the global architecture are integrated and coordinated to maximize the detection and interdiction of radiological or nuclear material, according to the report.
According to the DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal year 2007 for the 74 programs included in the global nuclear detection architecture.
Of this $2.8 billion, $1.1 billion was budgeted for programs to combat nuclear smuggling internationally; $220 million was devoted to programs to support the detection of radiological and nuclear material at the U.S. border; $900 million funded security and detection activities within the U.S.; and approximately $575 million was used to fund a number of cross-cutting activities.
The future costs for the DNDO and other federal agencies to address the gaps identified in the initial architecture are not yet known or included in these amounts, according to the report.
Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).